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Concerning Secularists' Proposed Restrictions on 
the Role of Religion in American Politics 
Richard H. Jones* 
What is the proper role of religious convictions in deciding 
political issues in America? Recent answers to this question 
run the gamut from the complete denial of any role of religious 
faith in justifying, and perhaps even motivating, laws or other 
public policies (the secularists, such as Bruce Ackerman, 
Thomas Nagel, and Robert Audi)1 to permitting only a certain 
type of religious faith to enter our political arena (Michael 
Perry? to suggesting that religious adherents should 
voluntarily bracket their religious commitments in certain in-
stances (Kent Greenawalt).3 
In this article, I will defend the extreme position, usually 
attacked today in academic circles in our society: that of a 
full-blooded role for all religious commitments as legitimate 
sources of justification and motivation of the position one takes 
on any public issue. The only limitation (with minor 
qualifications) that we should recognize on what can be 
* A.B. Brown University, 1973; M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D. Columbia University, 
1980; J.D. University of California at Berkeley, 1985. 
1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); 
Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of 
Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 259 (1989) [hereinafter The Separation of Church 
and State], Religion and the Ethics of Political Participation, 100 ETmcs 386 
(1990), and Religious Commitment and Secular Reason: A Reply to Professor 
Weithman, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1991) [hereinafter Religious Commitment]; 
Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PmL. & PuB. AFF. 215, 
218-34 (1987). 
2 MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER (1991). 
3 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988) 
[hereinafter RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS]; Religious Convictions and Political Choice: 
Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019 (1990) [hereinafter Some Further 
Thoughts]. That Greenawalt would accept a role for religious convictions in certain 
instances and his discussion of the Establishment Clause separate him from the 
secularists on important points. 
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advocated in politics in our society-and it is an important 
one-is imposed by the Establishment Clause. 
This article sets forth the argument for this position in 
four parts. Part I explores certain points about what 
constitutes religion relevant to this issue. Part II advances an 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause as it is applicable to 
politics. Part III discusses the role of reliance on religious com-
mitments within the political process in a society based upon 
the Establishment Clause, and part IV points out certain 
problems with secularists' visions for our society.4 
I. RELIGION 
A. Religion as a Way of Life 
Those who favor a strict separation of "church and state" 
most often characterize religion as, in the words of Thomas 
Jefferson, a private "matter which lies solely between man and 
his God."5 As the accommodationist Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger stated, "[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a 
private matter for the individual, the family, and the institu-
tion of private choice."6 Secularists (i.e., those who would deny 
religion any legitimate role in political decision-making or other 
public matters) take this view as ruling out the legitimacy of 
religion influencing civic affairs through the actions of private 
individuals acting upon their private religious convictions. 
Religion is reduced to a private matter for individuals, families, 
or private groups and of no relevance for issues that govern 
society as a whole. 
This view, however, misses the most important point about 
the role of religion in American politics: the way in which reli-
gion is comprehensive. Needless to say, not everyone who 
claims to be religious takes religion seriously; many merely 
identify with the religion of their youth or attend religious 
4 Whether a distinction should be drawn between private citizens and 
public officials on this issue will not be addressed here. See Some Further 
Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1035-36. 
5 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (citing Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)). Separationist 
characterizations of religion (such as those of James Madison) are most often cited 
in discussions of the Framers of the Establishment Clause; but these do not neces-
sarily represent the views of all who revised and ratified the First Amendment. 
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 54-55 (1986). 
6 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
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services for an hour on weekends without religious faith affect-
ing the rest of their lives. But the problem of religion in politics 
centers on those people for whom religious faith is not reduc-
ible to the acceptance of a set of propositions having no bearing 
outside one's intellectual life, or to an isolated set of personal 
practices, or a set of customary social practices that one does 
regardless of what one believes. Instead, religious faith for 
them is commitment to an encompassing way of life whose 
logical skeleton consists of (l) fundamental beliefs about the na-
ture of reality and a person and history, (2) guides for action 
(codes of conduct, norms, or ideals), and (3) values and goals, 
all oriented around what Paul Tillich referred to as an "ulti-
mate concern."7 Not all religious ways of life successfully inte-
grate these elements into a systematic, consistent whole, but 
all these elements are present in them. One's faith provides the 
framework within which one leads one's life and is expressed, 
among other ways, in one's actions towards others. 
Religious persons, like the nonreligious, search for a mean-
ing and order which will bring coherence to the disparate ele-
ments of their lives.8 What separates religious persons from 
the nonreligious is that the former find some purpose or other 
meaning to life, or a way to overcome suffering, that is not self-
created, individually or collectively. In other words, while it is 
certainly possible to have an ultimate concern or to find su-
preme meaning in what we are doing without being religious, 
one cannot be religious and think that the significance of living 
is only supplied by ourselves. For the religious, the meaning 
instead comes from a source which, by definition, must tran-
scend that to which it gives meaning. And thus, religious peo-
ple claim that the meaning they find in life is not subjective 
but is in some sense grounded in a reality encompassing us all. 
This reality in our country is usually conceived of in various 
theistic ways, but nontheistic realities are also possible sources 
of religious meaning. All dimensions of life are interpreted in 
light of this transcendent reality. The ultimate meaning and 
significance of any activity, including politics, is understood in 
terms of this source. 
Traditionally, religions provide a vision of life in which the 
most comprehensive ideas about the structure of reality (the 
7 PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE, 7-8 (1959). 
8 PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY OF RELIGION 124-25 (1967). 
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worldview) are such that the most general values and norms 
(the ethos) of the way of life are appropriate.9 The ethos, or 
"style of doing things" (e.g., nonviolence or compassion), gives a 
general orientation; even it does not determine one's course of 
action in any actual, complex situation. Basic symbols, such as 
"God," the Indian concept of "dharma," and the Taoist "tao," are 
not disinterested, descriptive terms depicting reality but in-
stead integrate factual and normative components into one 
order. Thus, basic values and the way of life as a whole are 
grounded in the very structure of reality. In this way, the pre-
dominant religion in a culture legitimizes the society's moral 
order-the religion renders the social order acceptable to its 
members and is therefore justified.10 
In sum, religion creates a framework providing meaning 
for a person's life. It is therefore unrealistic to hope to relegate 
religious faith to the realm of purely private opinion which 
should have no consequences for one's life as a whole or for 
one's public action in particular. 11 Not only does religion gov-
ern more than the limited areas in the life of the religious, it is 
irreducible to something exclusively personal or private. In-
stead, religion is comprehensive in the sense that all aspects of 
one's life are related in one degree or another to this funda-
mental framework. 
B. The Social and Political Expression of Religion 
The social and political expression of a religious person's 
life cannot be left outside of this fundamental and comprehen-
sive framework. Religion is never solely about life after death, 
or similar "other-worldly" matters, or any strictly private mat-
ter-it concerns the whole of our lives here and now. As part of 
this, actions toward other people are an essential part of reli-
gious ways of life, whether these actions are expressed on a 
one-to-one basis or on a society-wide basis. 12 As Tillich said, 
9 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 7, 89-90, 127 (1973). 
10 ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS OF RELIGION IN A 
POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD 21 (1970); BERGER, supra note 8, at 33. 
11 Religion is very much a social and public phenomenon. Each person's reli-
gious beliefs, values and practices may be his or her own variation or interpreta-
tion, but the components of one's religious faith are not individual to the exclusion 
of any role for a religious community and a continuing tradition. Religion is seldom 
private in the sense of being totally individual. The communal and historical di-
mensions of faith are paramount. 
12 Like many liberal dichotomies, the political distinction between "public" 
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"an ultimate concern must express itself socially. It cannot 
leave out any sphere of human existence."13 Even for religious 
communities which withdraw from society at large, issues of 
governing remain. 
In most Jewish and Christian traditions, God is viewed as 
concerned with human history, and it is the faithful's obligation 
to follow God's will on earth. Active participation in most public 
aspects of life becomes an obligation. One consequence of this is 
that there is no absolute dichotomy between religion and poli-
tics-politics of course is open to the nonreligious, and religion 
encompasses more than politics, but concern with social and 
political issues is one dimension of a religious way of life. 14 In 
short, participation in public life is part of the traditional reli-
gious life. 
Thus, the realms of God and Caesar are not totally dis-
tinct. Indeed, in many cultures and eras, church and state exist 
only within one order. This brings up another misapplied di-
chotomy-that between the religious and the secular. Secular-
ization is related to a decline in the influence of religion, al-
though "secular" is a term, like "religion," for which there is no 
established meaning or agreed-upon use. 15 American politics 
was "secularized" by the Establishment Clause in that our 
Constitution precludes religious authorities (texts, institutions, 
traditions, experiences, and persons) from being the exclusive 
source for justifying political positions-the unified 
church/state order was replaced by a "new order for the ages" 
in this regard. Thus, religion's traditional role in legitimizing 
our society was undercut. 
and "private" life has been called into question. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages 
of Decline of the Public I Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). 
13 TILLICH, supra note 7, at 178. 
14 "Social" and "political" cannot be absolutely distinguished. Politics may be 
construed broadly to include any issues related to power and economics, or restrict-
ed narrowly to problems of governing or managing a society. But both social and 
political issues involve concern for how people live together and thus cannot be 
completely separated. Similarly, morality, which involves how we act toward others 
and what weight we give to their well-being, may be expressed in individual inter-
actions or on a society-wide scale. Thus, morality and politics do not operate in 
totally distinct realms either. 
15 See Larry Shiner, The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research, 6 
J. Sci. STUD. RELIGION 207 (1967) (covering the history of the term "seculariza-
tion," identifying six different senses of the term, and arguing that the term should 
be dropped from empirical research because of the ambiguity in its use or explicit-
ly recognized as covering more than one idea). 
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But some theorists on the role of religion in American 
politics have been misled by the concept "secular" to conclude 
that there is a dichotomy of a religious realm and a secular 
one. "Secular" for these theorists comes to mean "nonreligious" 
plain and simple-something totally distinct from religion. In 
particular, our political realm must be nonreligious or antireli-
gious in the strong sense that religion can play no role in poli-
tics. Religion is thereby reduced from being the defining char-
acteristic of a society to being totally privatized, i.e., having no 
direct or indirect public role. However, if "secular" is taken to 
mean "barren of religion" or "hostile to religion," then politics 
in America is not secular and was never meant to be. Instead, 
as will be discussed below, 16 a better concept for describing 
the public life under our Establishment Clause is that of neu-
trality between religion and nonreligion. The religious have 
rights equal to the nonreligious in the public sphere (within the 
limits set by the Establishment Clause). Under our Constitu-
tion, government cannot marginalize or exclude religion from 
public life. 
The religious often take stands on "religious" issues (such 
as school prayer), but they also take stands on issues which 
secularists consider "secular" (such as abortion and slavery). 
Religious stands on political issues seem out of place to secular-
ists because they wrongly equate religion with other-worldly 
concerns or private conduct. Secularists apparently would per-
mit the religious to believe whatever they want but not to act 
on those beliefs; they would reduce religion to merely ideas, not 
the framework of one's entire life. However, if secularists real-
ized the comprehensive nature of religion, they would see that 
taking a stand on worldly issues is actually integral to many 
religious ways of life-political activity is an integral part of 
such ways of life, not merely an incidental consequence of belief 
which can be eliminated without affecting the way of life itself. 
Not all religious ways of life are concerned directly with poli-
tics, if politics is narrowly conceived as activities relating to the 
structures and processes of governing society. Nevertheless, 
social issues and politics are never totally distinguishable, and 
social issues of concern to many religious persons are part of 
the political realm. For example, to the religious, concerns for 
16 See discussion infra part II.A.l. 
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the poor and for justice are at the same time worldly and reli-
gious. 
However, while religion has a social/political dimension, 
not all religious people-even those whose faith shapes their 
lives deeply-feel compelled, when acting upon social issues on 
a society-wide scale, to impose on nonbelievers what their reli-
gious faith dictates. For example, Governor Mario Cuomo per-
sonally accepts the Catholic prohibition against abortion but 
does not feel that abortion should be prohibited for all peo-
ple. 17 This does not mean he is insincere or does not take his 
religious faith seriously, but merely that in making political 
decisions affecting all people, his religious code of conduct is 
not his only consideration. 
There is no contradiction in accepting certain principles as 
governing one's own personal conduct (and that of those who 
also voluntarily adopt them) and yet not requiring everyone to 
do likewise. For example, the issue is not what you would do if 
you became pregnant by rape but the separate issue of what 
you would require or allow other rape victims to do. Even some 
Evangelical Christians choose a non-imposition option because 
of the principles of religious liberty and tolerance.18 
Other religious people are more theocratic and weigh com-
peting considerations very differently. In a theocracy, the reli-
gious authority is seen as answering the basic political ques-
tions, and thus no political function exists for the citizenry 
except to enact what the religious authority states is to be the 
law. Church and state are thereby integrated: the state author-
ity is used to enforce conformity to a particular religious code 
on everyone. The theocrats' objective is to require all people to 
follow their code of conduct by making the public laws mirror 
what their religion demands of everyone's actions. The laws 
enacted in the state become those of a particular religious 
group, and that group's religious precepts are thereby imposed 
upon nonbelievers regardless of their beliefs. 19 
17 Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic 
Governor's Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL 'V 13 (1984). Justice 
William Brennan is another example of a public official who was both a staunch 
separationist and an observant Roman Catholic. 
18 See Samuel W. Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to 
Professor Greenawalt, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 292-93 (1992). 
19 For the distinction between imposition of a religious position and having 
a secular (nontheocratic) purpose or reason for a religious position, see discussion 
infra part II.B. 
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Secularists misconstrue the nature of religion in thinking 
that the logic of religious faith dictates that religious persons 
must try to impose their principles on the population as a 
whole. That is, if a group believes it has discovered the ulti-
mate truth, its members have no choice but to try to require it 
of everyone.20 In short, to be religious is to be theocratic. But 
secularists must realize that there is no one "religious" position 
on the issue of governing. In addition to Governor Cuomo's 
example, the fact that some religious groups (e.g., the Amish) 
withdraw from society at large demonstrates this point. Reli-
gious precepts, while comprehensive and compelling for the 
faithful, are not always felt to be required of everyone else in 
society, regardless of their faith. That is, the religious precepts 
of a community of believers govern their own lives and actions 
toward others.21 Politics involves another issue: how people 
outside one's religious community should themselves act. A 
decision has to be made by the religious as to how their faith 
relates to that issue. As indicated above, the decision is not a 
question of how sincerely or seriously one holds one's faith but 
what to require of people outside one's faith. A political judg-
ment, made within the framework of one's faith, is still needed. 
One option is neither to attempt to keep one's religious pre-
cepts strictly private nor to impose them by force of law on 
society as a whole, but to have one's faith inform one's political 
decisions as to how other people should act. One's faith in such 
circumstances would be a central consideration but not the only 
factor in determining what political position one chooses. 
In sum, secularists in their characterizations of religion 
miss an essential and separate issue in the area of governing: 
how should the religious deal with the conduct of people out-
20 E.g., Stephen Gey, Why Is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommo-
dation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITI. 
L. REV. 176 (1990). 
21 People may feel alienated if a political position they oppose wins majority 
support; they may feel the laws are being imposed upon them. If the religious feel 
that God's law supersedes the nation's laws, and therefore they do not have to 
obey the latter, the issue is not a theocracy but a Free Exercise exemption to the 
applicable laws. The Supreme Court in Employment Div. v. Smith, 472 U.S. 872, 
reh'g denied., 496 U.S. 913 (1990), came close to eviscerating the Free Exercise 
Clause in holding that the religious could not claim an exemption, no matter how 
compelling their religious reasons, to any neutral and generally applicable law. The 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 reinstates the "compelling state interest" 
requirement for enforcing a law when a Free Exercise exemption is claimed. 
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side their faith? To this question, there is no one "religious" 
answer.22 
C. The Concreteness of Religions 
Michael Perry has made the nature of religion an issue in 
the question of the role of religion in American politics. Perry's 
vision of "ecumenical politics" would permit only a certain type 
of conviction to be relied upon in political discussions. Perry 
would exclude "sectarian" religious beliefs, i.e., those beliefs 
which are considered "epistemologically privileged" and not 
intelligible or accessible to people who do not share those be-
liefs.23 To this end, he distinguishes between "religious faith" 
and "religious beliefs."24 Religious faith is characterized as 
"trust in the ultimate meaningfulness of life-that is, the ulti-
mate meaningfulness of the world and of one's own life, one's 
own being, as part of and related to, as embedded in, the 
world."25 Contrasted with this is religious belief: belief is "re-
ligious faith mediated by-understood and expressed in the 
medium of-words, whether concretely, in stories, or abstractly, 
in concepts and ideas."26 In this way, an "unknowable reality" 
becomes an object of belief as the specific source of meaning for 
a religious person. 
Perry would permit into political discussions only those 
persons who are willing to subject their religious commitments 
to a "self-critical rationality."27 What remains after this ex-
ercise is faith, as distinct from the particular beliefs of a specif-
ic religious tradition. Persons of religious faith, in contrast to 
those of religious belief, can share "commitment to certain au-
thoritative political-moral premises" and a pluralistic form of 
government. 28 
The problem with this proposal is basic: all religious com-
mitment is "sectarian"-there is no generic religious faith dis-
embodied from specific religious beliefs. Perry's characterization 
of religious faith may be useful as a definition of religion, but it 
22 Secularists' embarrassing caricatures of religion (e.g., ACKERMAN, supra 
note 1, at 40) reveal a lack of understanding of the subject under study that prob-
ably would not be tolerated for any other subject in academia. 
23 PERRY, supra note 2, at 106. 
24 !d. at 100-01. 
25 !d. at 73. 
26 !d. 
27 !d. at 74, 103. 
28 !d. at 125. 
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does not follow that there is any abstract, beliefless faith that 
is the substance to which all truly religious persons should ac-
tually adhere. To use an analogy, consider language. No one 
speaks language in the abstract. Instead, we speak English or 
some other specific language-there is no generic "language" 
but only a collection of activities that share a common feature 
or have family resemblances among themselves that we call 
languages. 29 
The same is true of religion: no one has a contentless faith 
in some generic Ultimate Reality or a commitment to the "ulti-
mate meaningfulness of life" in the abstract-all religious per-
sons have specific beliefs. 30 These beliefs cannot be treated as 
mere vehicles to an abstract, unknowable reality any more 
than specific languages can be treated as mere attempts to 
speak language in the abstract. Beliefs and values are the sub-
stance of a person's way of life, determining how one sees the 
world and treats others. Concrete beliefs and values of a total 
way of life, not an abstract category ("faith") within which all 
such ways of life fall, provide meaning to one's life. To say that 
the religious should not become too attached to their beliefs is 
to miss entirely the significance of such beliefs within a way of 
life. 
Similarly, different concepts of God and nontheistic tran-
scendent realities may all fall within the category theorists 
create called "Ultimate Reality." But that does not mean any 
religious person has faith in an abstract category rather than 
some concrete, highly-delineated reality.31 Belief in God is not 
a matter of faith (in Perry's sense of the term) but is as sectari-
an as belief in Jesus as the Christ or in the sacredness of the 
Qur'an. All versions of theism contrast, for example, with the 
29 George Santayana made the inverse point: "Any attempt to speak, without 
speaking some particular language, is just as hopeless as the attempt to have a 
religion that shall be no religion in particular." REASON IN RELIGION 15 (1906). 
30 "Believe" in the context of religion should not be contrasted with "know" 
to suggest an element of doubt or uncertainty. Instead, "believe" denotes a declara-
tion of one's faith (e.g., to "believe in" God means more than an intellectual assent 
to the proposition that there is a God), and one's "beliefs" are the intellectual con-
tent entailed by the commitment to a way of life. 
31 Perry may properly cite an historian of religions, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 
for some support. Smith divides religion into two components: "personal faith," 
which all religious people share, and the differing "cumulative traditions" which are 
the vehicles for faith. See generally WILFRED C. SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF 
RELIGION (1963) and FAITH AND BELIEF (1979). However, while Smith's work is 
highly influential, he does not have many followers on this point among historians 
of religions. 
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Brahman/Atman of Advaita Vedanta in that the religious reali-
ty in each of them is conceived as a personal, loving source. To 
reduce religion to some "faithness," devoid of any belief and 
value content, about the nature of reality, a person, and history 
is impossible. Religion is not an intellectual exercise; it is a 
way of life, and belief in a concrete reality informs that way of 
life. Perhaps some intellectuals, such as John Dewey in A Com-
mon Faith, with his vague sense of transcendence, might sat-
isfy Perry (even though that conception is itself specific and 
different from traditional religious realities).32 But all reli-
gious persons who adhere to more than a merely ethical "reli-
gion" have no such abstractions at the center of their ways of 
life. 
No study of religious persons could reveal them to be any-
thing but "sectarian." Thus, despite what Perry says, all reli-
gious discourse would have to be excluded from public political 
discussions if his proposal were accepted. That such a position 
conflicts with the Establishment Clause is the next topic. 
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Central to the position I am defending is that the Estab-
lishment Clause encapsulates the vision of what public role 
religion should play in our society. However, the constitutional 
requirement that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion"33 is subject to very different inter-
pretations. Therefore, I must clarify the interpretation of the 
clause advocated here as it applies to the issue of religion in 
politics. 
A. Presuppositions of the Establishment Clause 
That there is no neutral interpretation of the 
anti-establishment requirement is evidenced by the dispute 
over the intent of the Framers between the "separationists" 
(who adhere, in different degrees, to a strict separation of 
church and state) and the "accommodationists" (who would 
permit varying degrees of public accommodation of religion, 
short of an established church).34 However, the clause in its 
32 JoHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH 29-57 (1934). 
33 U.S. CaNST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause became applicable to the 
states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson v. Board of Educ., 
330 u.s. 1, 15 (1947). 
34 For a study of the tension between the two approaches see Richard H. 
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historical context appears to presuppose three fundamental 
premises which favor a generally separationist interpretation: 
neutrality between religions, the separation of the institutions 
of church and state, and a favorable view of a role for religion 
in American public life. 
1. The government must be officially neutral with regard to 
religion 
First, the Framers lived in a religious society which may 
have had a de facto Protestant establishment, but the Estab-
lishment Clause they created envisions a society in which the 
government must be officially neutral between religions.35 No 
religion is to be privileged, and thus our society is religiously 
pluralistic in the eyes of the law. The Supreme Court has artic-
ulated this principle to mean that under the Establishment 
Clause the government cannot establish an official church, and 
in addition, cannot "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another."36 Thus, "govern-
ment may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious 
doctrine or organization."37 This principle does not mean gov-
ernment must take a hostile, anti-religious stance; rather, the 
Jones, Accommodationist and Separationist Ideals in Supreme Court Establishment 
Clause Decisions, 28 J. CHURCH & ST. 193 (1986). Political theorists may not be 
interested in what the Framers intended, arguing that the role of religion in poli-
tics has now changed. But the Framers' intent is what courts purport to look at in 
their decisions. 
35 E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985). Neutrality itself is open to separationist and 
accommodationist interpretations. See Jones, supra note 34, at 204-06. The Su-
preme Court has made the controversial expansion of this neutrality principle to 
include not aiding religion over nonreligion. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. It may be 
argued that the Establishment Clause permits favoring religion over nonreligion. 
See Richard H. Jones, "In God We Trust" and the Establishment Clause, 31 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 411-16 (1989). Nonreligion in the form of atheism (i.e., the denial of 
any kind of God) simply did not exist in America at the time the Constitution was 
framed. JAMES TuRNER, WITHOUT GoD, WITHOUT CREED 44 (1985). Therefore, the 
Framers in all likelihood were not considering the relation of religion and 
nonreligion. However, it can also be argued that since nonreligion is an option 
today that the Establishment Clause has to treat equally with the religious those 
for whom religious questions hold no significance and those who are anti-religious, 
since they all compete on the same level as ways of life. That is, the Constitution 
cannot favor religious ways of life over nonreligious ones, and so neutrality must 
be maintained among all comprehensive views and the lack of any. 
36 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. This principle has been affirmed as recently as 
the last Term. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992). 
37 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989). 
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government can neither advance nor hinder the cause of reli-
gion.38 In short, our government ''has no authority whatsoever 
in religious matters."39 
This neutrality, however, means that the First Amendment 
is not neutral to all types of religion. The Framers' position 
entails a value judgment as to the nature of our society: our 
society is to be pluralistic, not theocratic. Therefore, the Estab-
lishment Clause will conflict with those religious ways of life 
that advocate a theocratic society. In a theocracy, the govern-
ment reflects one set of religious beliefs and values-the 
country's laws will be "God's laws," or our country will be de-
clared to be a "Christian nation" (or the equivalent for another 
tradition).40 But in adopting the Establishment Clause, the 
Framers denied that the government would advocate one reve-
lation or one religious way of life as privileged. Even if we 
could somehow determine one religious tradition to be the "true 
religion," we have nevertheless chosen to structure our country 
so as not to live in a theocracy. In the words of Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, this clause withdraws "from the sphere of legiti-
mate legislative concern and competence a specific, but compre-
hensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the 
verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in 
action of that belief or disbelief."41 
All religious advocacy in our system becomes a matter 
exclusively for private parties. This does not mean, however, 
that religion is thereby relegated to the sphere of the purely 
private, but only that, unlike in a theocracy, no religion is to be 
proclaimed or otherwise endorsed by the government as the 
true religion or denounced as false. Thus, America is not a 
Christian nation de jure, no matter what the religion of the ma-
jority of the populace, and attempts to translate religious val-
ues into public policy will be limited by the requirements of the 
Establishment Clause.42 
38 That this clause also protects religion from intervention by the govern-
ment is often overlooked. As the Supreme Court recently said: "The First 
Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression 
are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State." Weisman, 112 
S. Ct. at 2656. 
39 THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 215 (1986). 
40 See discussion supra part LB. 
41 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 at 465-66 (1961). 
42 The need for a nontheocratic purpose or justification (discussed infra in 
part II.B) is particularly great since there is a dominant de facto religious majority 
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This neutrality is often labelled "secularity," but that label 
is deceptive. The problem once again is what exactly "secular" 
means. The Establishment Clause forbids governmental hostili-
ty toward religion.43 The Supreme Court's comment about a 
"secular state" reflects this: "A secular state, it must be remem-
bered, is not the same as an atheistic or anti-religious state. A 
secular state establishes neither atheism nor religion as its 
official creed."44 Thus, it is more accurate to refer to a state 
under the Establishment Clause as pluralistic or neutral rather 
than secular. For the issue at hand, the most important conse-
quence of this is that, as far as the government is concerned, 
the political arena is pluralistic, not free from religion. 
2. Separation of the institutions of church and state 
The second presupposition relates to the first. The First 
Amendment neither defines the phrase "respecting an estab-
lishment" nor what constitutes a "religion." It does not use the 
words "church" and "state," a dichotomy introduced into our ju-
risprudence later by Thomas Jefferson.45 However, despite the 
clause's broad language, most scholars agree that the Framers' 
concern was with taxes and other support for churches.46 That 
is, "establishment" involves governmental financial or symbolic 
support for institutions (i.e., Christian churches or 
in our society. Guarding minorities against the danger of the possible "tyranny of 
the majority" is central to the First Amendment. See Jones, supra note 35, at 402. 
Courts must invalidate a law, no matter how popular that law might be, if the 
argument for it is based exclusively on the religious authorities of one or more 
religious groups. 
43 The government may not interfere with the role of religion in soci-
ety-hostility toward religion is an effect as prohibited under the Establishment 
Clause as aid for religion. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
Secularists may argue that by eliminating all references to basic frames of refer-
ence they are treating religious persons neutrally. See discussion infra part IV.B. 
However, in requiring that political debate be carried on in secular terms, they are 
not being neutral. Use of nonreligious language is not the lowest common denomi-
nator between competing ways of life but instead reflect specific 
belief-commitments. (No attempt at a lowest common denominator would satisfy ev-
eryone since it would not reflect the full commitment of faith which the partici-
pants would require.) Not only would religion not be treated neutrally in the lan-
guage of political debate under the secularists' vision, but the secularists could (not 
surprisingly) use their own frameworks without adjustment, unlike the religious 
participants. 
44 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610. 
45 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (citing Letter to 
Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1800)). 
46 CURRY, supra note 39, at 120. 
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non-Christian equivalents); it does not involve more generally 
the religious beliefs and practices of individuals.47 The prohi-
bition against favoring one religion over another or aiding all 
religions, therefore, must be interpreted as a prohibition 
against promoting religious institutions, not a restriction on the 
religious beliefs and actions of individual people. 
The consequence for the issue at hand is that the institu-
tions of church and state are to be kept separated, but no such 
constitutional requirement exists for the activities of religion 
and politics. The difference is that religious commitments can 
inform people's positions on public matters, while the institu-
tions of church and state remain distinct. Religious commit-
ments of religious citizens may influence government action, 
but there is no identification of church with state. This differs 
from a theocracy in that, even if a church endorses a particular 
position, the governmental action must be justified on 
nontheocratic grounds.48 Thus, the Establishment Clause does 
not relegate religion to a strictly private role in persons' 
lives-religion's public function is permitted to flourish. 
Nothing in the Supreme Court's decisions suggests a sepa-
ration of religion and politics. Even a strict separation of insti-
tutions has not been consistently maintained by the Court. 
Accommodationist justices often argue that the First Amend-
ment, in the words of Justice William 0. Douglas, "does not say 
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of 
Church and State. Otherwise the state and religion would be 
aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriend-
ly."49 Allowing some accommodation by government of citizen's 
religious interests merely reflects, in the words of the Supreme 
Court, the "common sense" of the matter-the state's "callous 
indifference" toward religion was never intended by the Estab-
lishment Clause.5° Former Chief Justice Burger put the point 
this way: 
No significant segment of our society and no institution with-
in it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation 
47 Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1615-25 (1989); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the 
'Secular': Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 962-71 
(1989). 
48 See discussion infra part II.B. 
49 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). 
50 ld. at 314. 
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from all the other parts, much less from government. It has 
never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a 
regime of total separation. Nor does the Constitution require 
complete separation of church and state. 51 
Even separationist justices accept some accommodations. 52 
3. Role for religion in American public life 
The second presupposition is supported by the third: the 
Founders, as evidenced by the acts of the early federal govern-
ment, valued the social role of religion and did not intend to 
make religion absolutely separate from government. Many, al-
though not all, of the Founders were profoundly religious and 
their consensus was that religion and morality were essential 
for the survival of the Republic. In the words of George Wash-
ington from his Farewell Address: "Of all the dispositions and 
habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality 
are indispensable supports."53 The actions of the First Con-
gress also show that the Founders did not intend the Establish-
ment Clause to bar all government support of religion in its 
public capacity.54 For example, the oft-cited Northwest Terri-
tory Ordinance of 1789 in providing for schools refers to reli-
gion, along with morality and knowledge, as ''being necessary 
to good government and the happiness of mankind."55 
In sum, the Establishment Clause operates in a society in 
which religion has a public function and it merely prohibits the 
establishment of one or more particular religions. The implica-
tion here is that reliance upon religious commitments (other 
than theocratic ones) in political matters is constitutional. 
Separationists who are hostile to religion in general or to its 
public expression may disagree; but other separationists, along 
51 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (citation omitted). 
52 See e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1947) (Rutledge, 
J., dissenting); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970); Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2465-67 (1993). 
53 Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, reprinted in RUSSELL E. 
RICHEY & DONALD G. JONES, EDS., AMERICAN CNIL RELIGION (1974), at 26. As 
Bellah notes, the words may be Alexander Hamilton's. 
54 Douglas Laycock, 'Non-Preferential' Aid to Religion: A False Claim About 
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY 1. REV. 875, 909 (1986). 
55 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 51, 52 (1789). Citing actions of the First Congress 
for evidence of the intent of the Framers is problematic-some of their actions 
were unconstitutional. But those actions are some indication of the general atmo-
sphere of the time. 
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with accommodationists, will agree that reliance on such reli-
gious commitments does not raise a constitutional issue. The 
issue instead turns to how we distinguish theocratic from 
nontheocratic actions. 
B. Determining if Governmental Action Is Constitutional 
The principal test developed by the Supreme Court to de-
termine if a governmental action is constitutional is set forth in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman in three prongs: the action (1) must have a 
legitimate secular purpose, (2) must not have the principal or 
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) 
must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with 
religion.56 Any attempt to restrict religious commitments as a 
source of political action would no doubt be decided under this 
test. 57 
Focusing here on the "secular purpose" requirement is 
sufficient to see the problems for the issue at hand (although it 
must be remembered that the effect and entanglement require-
ments also need to be satisfied). Under this purpose require-
ment, the question is whether the government's "actual pur-
pose is to endorse or disapprove of religion."58 The Supreme 
Court has summarized the analysis as follows: 
A governmental intention to promote religion is clear when 
the State enacts a law to serve a religious purpose. This in-
tention may be evidenced by promotion of religion in general, 
or by advancement of a particular religious belief .... While 
the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a 
56 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Despite profound criticism of each prong by 
members of the Court and by commentators, the Lemon test is still alive. See 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2148 
(1993); 113 S.Ct. at 2149-51 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
57 Other Establishment Clause tests apply only in more specialized circum-
stances, not general political discourse. See Richard H. Jones, "In God We Trust" 
and the Establishment Clause, 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 381, 404-10 (1989). 
58 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (quoting Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice O'Connor in her con-
currence in Lynch advanced an influential "endorsement" test for the purpose re-
quirement: the question becomes whether the governmental action "sends a mes-
sage to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, fa-
vored members of the political community." 465 U.S. at 688. Any governmental 
action that singles out all religious persons in their political activities from the 
nonreligious, as the secularists would, would fail under this test by sending a mes-
sage to the religious that they are outsiders. 
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secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such 
purpose be sincere and not a sham.59 
What the Court has not made clear is what exactly is "sec-
ular" and what exactly is a "purpose." Kent Greenawalt propos-
es the seemingly innocuous requirement that the purpose can-
not be, for example, to end "sinfulness," but must identify 
"some genuine damage to individuals or society (or other enti-
ties)."60 However, the problem here is that people will dis-
agree over what exactly is genuine damage. The answer will 
depend upon one's frame of reference: some religious persons 
will think that sinfulness is as genuine and objective as any 
physical or psychological damage-it may be less tangible, but 
it is no less real. 61 Similarly, people will disagree over what is 
the public good to be achieved for the society as a whole, and 
consequently over what constitutes harm. All legislation neces-
sarily reflects particular background beliefs and values. 62 
Thus, it is difficult to attempt to limit the scope of governmen-
tal action only to what everyone agrees is genuine damage 
precisely because the real political dilemmas over such social 
issues as abortion arise only where there is fundamental dis-
agreement at the time over underlying beliefs. 
1. Defining "religious purpose" 
The disagreement leads to the larger issue of defining a 
religious purpose. What the anti-religious consider a "religious" 
purpose may not appear particularly religious to the faithful. 
Perhaps no one can neatly segregate all elements of their own 
way of life into "religious" and "nonreligious" segments. What 
appears to one who participates in a certain way of life to be 
simply "the way things really are" may appear to an outsider 
as unwarranted, speculative assumptions. The same holds for 
values within a way of life: to an insider, the values do not 
appear to be "religious," they are simply objective facts, ground-
ed in reality, by which we all ought to live. For example, for 
the religious, morality is no more "secular" than "religious." 
59 Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 585-87 (citations omitted). 
60 REUGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 94. 
61 See discussion infra part IV.B., concerning frameworks of belief. 
62 Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of 
Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 403 (1963). 
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In addition, religious people are as divided on political 
issues as the nonreligious-there is no one "religious" position 
on any major social/political issue. Therefore, whatever action 
the government takes will have to coincide with the values and 
goals of some religious people. But "that the Judea-Christian 
religions oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the 
Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establish-
ment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny."63 As the Su-
preme Court has often noted, harmonizing with a religious 
position on a social issue (such as abortion) is not sufficient to 
render a governmental action unconstitutional, as long as the 
action has a valid secular justification. 64 Indeed, there have 
been religious justifications for any political position (e.g., be-
fore the Civil War, both for and against slavery),65 and there 
will always be a religious purpose to be satisfied on both sides 
of any controversial issue. In such circumstances, defining a 
purpose as secular is not a simple matter.66 As Laurence Tribe 
states: "If a purpose were to be classified as non-secular simply 
because the resulting state practice coincided with the beliefs of 
a religion, or because it originated in a religion, then virtually 
nothing that government does would be acceptable."67 
Thus, in the context of the Establishment Clause, "secular" 
cannot mean simply "not religious." A more appropriate stan-
dard for the requirement of secularity should therefore be 
merely a restatement of the anti-theocracy requirement: the 
government's purpose must be more than simply trying to align 
society with some religious vision. The theocrats' political goal 
is to impose their religious authority on people outside the 
group. This is precisely what the Establishment Clause prohib-
its the government from doing.68 
However, one may nevertheless argue religiously without 
being theocratic. Such arguments would be grounded in the 
beliefs and values of a particular religious way of life but would 
not consist solely of the fact that certain religious authorities 
require the governmental action. For example, the religious 
may advocate laws against murder out of a concern with the 
63 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980). 
64 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 603 n.8 (1988); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 682 (1984); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961). 
65 See RELIGION AND SLAVERY xi-xiii (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989). 
66 Smith, supra note 47, at 999-1007. 
67 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9 (2d ed. 1988). 
68 See discussion supra part II.A. 
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ultimate significance (as defined by that religion's belief-frame-
work) of each human life; such arguments need not be either 
theocratically-based (i.e., solely invoking what the religious 
authorities require) or "secular" in the sense of not being tied 
to the dimension of ultimate meaning in a religious way of life. 
The religious arguments for an action need not convince the 
nonreligious or appeal to members of other religious groups. 
But the Establishment Clause prohibits a governmental action 
whose only support is merely that the authorities of one or 
more religious groups require it. Operationally, this means that 
the religious cannot rest their arguments exclusively with Bib-
lical or other religious decrees. 
Thus, a religious purpose for a governmental action is le-
gitimate, but its support cannot be limited to the religious 
authority of a group.69 Therefore, "secular" in this context 
means simply any argument not justified exclusively by refer-
ence to a religious community's authority (such as a revelation 
embodied in a fundamental text) or to some private insight or 
other personal religious experience, not the opposition with all 
things religious. 70 
In short, if we continue to use the concept of "secularity," 
then "secular" in the context of the Establishment Clause 
means simply "nontheocratic." Any other "religious" elements to 
a justification or to the identification of a social harm are "secu-
lar" in this regard. This suggests once again that the dichotomy 
between religious and secular is at best unhelpful and that 
some other concept (such as "neutral" or" pluralistic") should be 
used instead of "secular" in defining this prong of the Lemon 
test. 
69 The purpose requirement cannot be simply that an action is for the good 
of everyone or open to all people, since theocrats would argue that that is precisely 
what they also want. Like most political advocates, theocrats would say that what 
they advocate is good for all of society and open to all who wish to join, and that 
their authorities are in fact open to all to adopt. See also discussion infra note 
116. 
70 See discussion supra part I.B. Audi defines a "secular reason" as "one 
whose normative force ... does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God . 
. . or on theological considerations." The Separation of Church and State, supra 
note 1, at 278. However, this definition would apparently remove all of religion. 
For example, are all moral considerations by a religious person within a moral 
religious way of life "theological considerations?" A religious person would certainly 
think so. Secularists cannot simply separate out what they value and call it "secu-
lar." 
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2. Defining "purpose" 
Turning to the second problem-the absence of a definition 
of "purpose"-difficulties resurface. Purpose is distinguished by 
the Court as different from effect (what actually results from a 
governmental action) but is not otherwise characterized. 71 The 
term "purpose" is open to many different meanings: it may 
mean purpose proper (the goal or objective to be achieved), 
motive (why we are doing the action), justification or rationale 
(the reasons or evidence for defending the purpose as valuable 
for all members of society), or argumentation (the presentation 
or advocacy of the justification). These various concepts, while 
related, must be distinguished. The Supreme Court, however, 
has not clearly distinguished the purpose from the motive or 
rationale for an act. In particular, the Supreme Court has 
found legislation in four cases to be unconstitutional for vio-
lating only the purpose requirement when the Court focused 
primarily upon the legislators' motives. 72 
If the various concepts packed into the purpose require-
ment are separated, the interpretation which best captures the 
purpose requirement is: (1) the predominant goal or objective 
for the governmental action must be clearly secular;73 or (2) if 
the goal or objective is ambiguous, then the government must 
71 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
72 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-95 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 57, 60 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 43 (1980); Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-8 (1968) (pre-Lemon case utilizing the same purpose 
requirement). Each of these cases would have the same result under the refine-
ment of the purpose requirement proposed here, since no "secular" purposes or 
justifications (other than shams) were advanced. In none of these cases does the 
Supreme Court ever clearly differentiate motive from objective (purpose). For exam-
ple, in Ja(free, the Court said "the First Amendment requires that a statute must 
be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." 472 
U.S. at 56. Whether anyone is "entirely motivated" by any one source is question-
able, and mixing motive and purpose here only confuses the issue more. 
73 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2654 (1992) ("clearly secular purpose"). 
How much nonreligious purpose is enough? The Supreme Court has not been clear 
concerning whether any legitimate nonreligious purpose, no matter how insignifi-
cant, is sufficient to render an action constitutional (as suggested by Ja(free, 472 
U.S. at 56, where the Court stated that a statute must be invalidated if it is en-
tirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion; cf Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 
589, 602 (1988); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)), or whether the reli-
gious purpose must predominate to find the action unconstitutional (Aguillard, 482 
U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., concurring)). The latter position appears to be more realis-
tic: the Establishment Clause should not turn on simply finding any insignificant 
nonreligious purpose. In short, the theocratic purpose must not predominate to the 
exclusion of other purposes. 
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advance a clearly secular justification (the set of reasons show-
ing why the purpose should be achieved) sufficient to support 
the action. "Secular" here is used in the narrow 
(anti-theocratic) sense, discussed above in this section, which 
requires that revelations in religious texts or personal religious 
experiences are not the only justifications for the government's 
action. The first condition requires that if an action's purpose is 
primarily theocratic (in that it has no goal or objective other 
than attempting to align society with some religious vision), 
then the action is unconstitutional; justifications are irrelevant. 
The second condition comes into play only if the government's 
stated goal is not clearly secular. Such a circumstance occurs 
when the objectives are mixed, i.e., both theocratic and 
nontheocratic objectives exist for an act. The nontheocratic 
justification must be genuine and sufficient enough to with-
stand a court challenge: just as there may be sham purposes 
contrived only to try to satisfy the Lemon test, so may the 
courts have to determine if a purported secular justification 
does in fact justify the action or is merely contrived for the 
sake of appearance. 74 
The problem of sham objectives in politics is very real. In 
such cases, courts must decide which is the predominant ob-
jective. Sanford Levinson poses a problem in this regard which 
is the opposite of the usual problem of religious purposes dis-
guised as secular. 75 What if legislation with a genuine secular 
objective is clothed in religious garb, e.g., an environmental 
protection act entitled "The Stewardship of God's Creation Act 
of 1993?" Under the interpretation of the purpose requirement 
proposed here, if the primary objective clearly is narrowly theo-
cratic (i.e., having no purpose other than to align society with a 
religious vision), as would appear to be the case from its title 
and preamble, then the statute would be unconstitutional de-
spite its secular value. The second condition (a clearly 
74 It should be noted that courts have accepted sacrilegious purposes (e.g., 
promoting tourism and sales by use of Christian symbols during the Christmas 
season) as satisfying the purpose requirement. E.g., ACLU v. Rabun County, 698 
F.2d 1098, 1109 (11th Cir. 1983). Courts may be similarly lenient with regard to 
the secular justification requirement. In any case, something of a philosophical 
judgment is required in determining what is the "primary" purpose and what is a 
sufficient justification. 
75 Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 2061, 2071-73 (1992) (book review). 
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nontheocratic justification) would not be considered since the 
statute's purpose is not ambiguous. 
Most importantly, under the interpretation proposed here, 
the motive of the individual legislator or other government 
official is always irrelevant.76 Motives, even more than objec-
tives, will probably be mixed-we seldom act for any one mo-
tive. They are also more difficult to discern. Secularists may 
feel that determining the motivation of religious persons is a 
simple matter-that religious faith is always the sole source 
shaping and controlling other beliefs, but that is not always so. 
Consider William Jennings Bryan's fundamentalism and his 
opposition to evolution. Prior to World War I, he was neutral 
on the issue of evolution. But after the war, he concluded that 
the evolutionary doctrines of Darwin and Nietzsche were the 
cause of the war. He then began to oppose evolution and also 
took a more fundamentalist turn in his religion.77 Thus, what 
might appear to be a simplistic religious opposition to science 
was actually more complex. Politics was a motive for the 
change in religious belief, not vice versa. 
Motives may involve psycho-social causes and various ra-
tionales that are hard to distinguish, and, more importantly, 
are simply irrelevant to the purpose and effect of the govern-
mental action. The motive for supporting some legislation may 
be primarily to get re-elected or to please family and friends. 
Even if some legislators act purely from religious motives, their 
acts would be held constitutional as long as one of the two con-
ditions above is fulfilled. 78 Thus, motives do not need to be 
analyzed at all since they are irrelevant to assessing the value 
76 The interpretation proposed here would modify the requirement in Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987), that if a religious motive is shown, 
then the advocates of the challenged action must show that the action would nev-
ertheless have been undertaken even in the absence of such motivation. Instead, 
the requirement should be that even if a theocratic motive is shown, the action is 
constitutional if there is a legitimate nontheocratic purpose or justification. The 
action may not have been undertaken in the absence of theocratic motivation, but 
it would still be constitutional under such circumstances. 
77 See GARRY WILLS, UNDER GoD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 101-05 
(1990). 
78 To apply this principle to another area: judges who are permitted to exer-
cise their discretion and who are acting within sentencing guidelines should be 
allowed to rely upon their (nontheocratic) religious convictions. But see United 
States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740-41 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting this position). 
Compare Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1083 
(1990), with Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 932, 943 (1989), and RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 239-41. 
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of the proposed governmental action. 79 The psychological or 
social factors animating our motivations are not related closely 
enough to the public purpose or effect of an action to be a rele-
vant consideration. We need not find the "real" reasons or caus-
es for wanting an act if the purpose is secular (i.e., 
nontheocratic), or if the purpose is unclear, the justification is 
secular. Certainly requiring, as Robert Audi would, a "secular 
motivation" for advocating any public policy is unnecessary if 
either of the two conditions is satisfied.80 His position reflects 
more an unabashed prejudice against religion than any consti-
tutional requirement. No motive, unlike purposes and justifica-
tions, is constitutional or unconstitutional, and attempting to 
restrain motives unnecessarily restricts the religious.81 In 
short, no motive is illegitimate or impermissible, no matter how 
dominant and apparent-only the purpose and justification 
matter. 
Finally, the argumentation for the secular purpose may be 
anything the arguer thinks will be persuasive. It is the purpose 
or justification that must satisfy the two conditions, not the 
argumentation. The difference between justification and argu-
mentation lies between a rigorous presentation of the rationale 
for a position (the justification) and the marshalling of whatev-
er reasons one wishes to advance for a position (the argumenta-
79 It is not clear what sense can be made of the concept of the collective 
motive of legislators or citizens. For a discussion of the problems of delving into 
legislators' subjective motives, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 614-17 
(1987); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 18-23 (1985); Hal Culberton, 
Religion in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, U. ILL. L. 
REV. 924-5 (1990) (legislative purpose as legal fiction). In the absence of a clear 
concept, keeping motive out of constitutional analysis can only help. Certainly deal-
ing with purposes and justifications is at least somewhat more "objective" in the 
sense of being more open to discernment and consensus. 
80 The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 284. Audi defines 
his principle of secular motivation as "one should not advocate or promote any le-
gal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one ... is ... motivated 
by adequate secular reason .... " !d. He does allow motivation by religious consid-
erations as well, as long as there is an adequate or sufficient set of secular rea-
sons. !d. This principle is for him an additional requirement to a secular rationale 
for advocating a public policy. !d. at 279. 
81 When people cannot advance legitimate secular (nontheocratic) purposes or 
reasons for a political position, we can safely say that they are motivated solely by 
religion. Thus, in this narrow usage, "religious motive" is simply another way of 
saying "no legitimate secular justification," and so "religious motivation" in this 
limited sense would be unconstitutional. But religious motivation in the more usual 
sense of the phrase-i.e., religious commitments motivating a political position-is 
as constitutional as any motivation when the secular purpose requirement is ful-
filled. 
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tion). The former is a more limited enterprise, while the latter 
encompasses any free-wheeling debate tactic. 
Thus, participants in political debates may rely in their 
argumentation on religious sources if they think that, as a 
practical matter, the religious sources help the argument. Like 
anyone else, religious participants may choose, for tactical 
reasons, to present only some of their reasons and to leave out 
what they think will not be persuasive to anyone outside their 
religious group.82 Common sense dictates that quoting the Bi-
ble will not convince atheists, and that one's argument should 
be selected according to one's audience. Most arguments on 
social issues by religious people in disputes with persons out-
side their religious group may in fact be indistinguishable from 
arguments by the nonreligious, if they can be confined to the 
level of political actions alone and not involve the underlying 
bases for holding the different positions.83 But if Christian 
fundamentalists want to assert a Biblical basis for an act that 
has a secular (nontheocratic) objective or justification, they 
may. There is no need to advance only reasons that supposedly 
all citizens would accept, even if such arguments were possi-
ble.84 
Similarly, it is perfectly legitimate (contra Audi) to use as 
justifications, reasons that do not personally motivate the 
arguer. 85 The religious may advance reasons that are accept-
able to their nonreligious opponents to try to convince them. As 
long as one finds those reasons legitimate, there is nothing 
hypocritical or deceitful in only advancing arguments that one 
thinks are legitimate and will convince one's opponent, even if 
the arguments are not part of the proposed justification for the 
action.86 Such tactics are constitutional-deciding to restrict 
the range of one's arguments is different from imposing restric-
tions on the permissible purpose or justification for a govern-
82 E.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-49 (1990). 
83 Whether this is possible is questionable. See discussion infra part IV.B. 
84 See discussion infra part IV.B. 
85 The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 282. Compare RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 220 (effective political discourse does not 
require full disclosure of all personal judgments and other bases upon which a 
decision is reached) and Some Further Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1023, 1046. 
86 One might go even further and argue that one may use arguments one 
does not in fact accept. For example, secularists could study the Bible in order to 
try to convince Christian fundamentalists on biblical grounds that they are wrong 
on a political issue. Either side might use arguments that only appeal to the other 
side in such circumstances. 
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mental action.87 Politics is comparable to arguing in court, 
with extremely broad rules of evidence, in this regard: as long 
as what the law requires is fulfilled (the nontheocratic purpose 
or justification), there is wide latitude toward what evidence is 
marshalled for use and what strategy is chosen to convince the 
jury (the argumentation). 
Thus, religious argumentation is constitutional. Christian 
fundamentalists, like everyone else (including secularists), need 
not disclose their motives but only their purposes and justifica-
tions for the proposed actions. In this way, religious discourse 
has a legitimate place in the public political arena, even if 
governmental actions cannot be for "religious" purposes and 
reasons (in the narrow theocratic sense discussed earlier in this 
section). 
This requirement for constitutionality is a modest one. 
Most governmental actions should pass the purpose require-
ment. The only actions that would fail are those for which 
there is no secular (nontheocratic) predominant purpose or 
sufficient justification, i.e., the actions' defenders can only ad-
vance religious texts embodying revelation or personal experi-
ences as purposes or justifications. Such an action would gain 
majority support normally only in communities in which most 
of the population belongs to the same religious group. For ex-
ample, in a town in Missouri where dancing violated religious 
tenets of the majority, a ban on school dances was upheld by 
the school board even though no secular (nontheocratic) pur-
pose or justification was articulated at trial.88 On a larger so-
cial scale, however, the population is more pluralistic, and so 
arguments with wider appeal than the narrow theocratic ones 
usually must be advanced in order to gain majority support for 
a governmental action (although exceptions, such as the legisla-
tion at issue in Epperson v. Arkansas89 and Edwards v. 
Aguillard,90 have occurred). 
87 All that should be excluded from politics is deception or dishonesty con-
cerning proposed actions, purposes, or justifications. That is, we should not conceal 
our true political program but be forthright about our positions on issues, regard-
less of our motives and total arguments for them. 
88 The district court held the school board's action to be unconstitutional, 
but the court was reversed on appeal, even though the court of appeal did not 
identify any secular purpose. Clayton by Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850 (W.D. 
Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990). 
89 393 u.s. 97 (1968). 
90 482 u.s. 578 (1987). 
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Ill. RELIGION IN POLITICS 
The conclusions of parts I and II are as follows: First, reli-
gious ways of life are not purely private matters but have a so-
cial/political dimension, and not all religious persons are com-
mitted to the theocratic option in politics. Second, the Estab-
lishment Clause does not require a religiously sterile public 
life, and, more particularly, it does not prohibit all reliance on 
religious commitments in the political arena-the usual dichot-
omy between "secular" and "religious" does not adequately 
analyze the issues. Under the purpose requirement of the Lem-
on test for constitutionality, political positions may be main-
tained for religious reasons as long as their predominant pur-
poses are secular (in the sense of not being theocratic, i.e., not 
exclusively based on religious revelations and personal experi-
ences), or if the purpose is ambiguous, the positions have a 
sufficient secular justification. In short, revelation or other reli-
gious authority is a legitimate source of political ideas and 
justifications, but more must be advanced by the religious as 
justification than simply that their religion requires aligning 
society with a religious way of life. 
In the context of politics, this interpretation means that 
only theocrats, who want to impose God's law or another 
religion's equivalent upon believers and nonbelievers, would be 
advocating unconstitutional positions because they assert and 
rely only upon what they take to be revealed rather than ad-
vance other purposes or justifications. 
The final step in the argument is to show that the Estab-
lishment Clause is the only restriction we should recognize in 
this democracy on the issue of religion in political life. The 
principal argument in favor of this position is simply to note 
the absence of either any other legal restrictions (except for two 
to be mentioned shortly) or of any plausible alternative inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause in the context of politics. 
Perry and Audi frame their discussions of religion in poli-
tics as "ideals" for a democratic society to be voluntarily chosen 
rather than to be imposed by force of law.91 But, if we ignore 
the Establishment Clause or some other legal framework, it is 
difficult to make sense of what restrictions these theorists 
91 The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 276, 283; Religious 
Commitment, supra note 1, at 76; PERRY, supra note 2, at 137. See discussion infra 
part IV.C. 
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propose.92 What are they talking about if not the legal frame-
work of this society? Mter we determine what actions are per-
mitted under the law, what is left? What other type of restric-
tions can our society impose? What other type of sanctions? In 
short, if we do not voluntarily adopt the restrictions of the 
secularist ideals, what recourse do the secularists propose? 
They may feel our society would be better if everyone accepted 
secular ideals as political conventions. For this, they would 
have to argue that a society with no religion in the public fo-
rum is better than our existing society. 
Indeed, it would be very difficult to defend other restric-
tions on religious political speech. The Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment restricts the government from limiting 
the right of the religious to participate in politics.93 The Free 
Speech Clause only enhances the protection of religious speech 
in public. According to the Supreme Court, public debate of 
political issues is to be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."94 
Political speech is the paradigm of what is protected under the 
First Amendment, and all political speech-including religious 
political speech-is on the same footing in the marketplace of 
ideas. This means that religious persons may advocate any 
position in any way they choose (within the court-interpreted 
restrictions on their Free Speech rights). The restriction of the 
Establishment Clause is that governmental action must have a 
secular purpose or justification (in the narrow anti-theocratic 
sense of "secular")95 to withstand a court challenge. But no 
political speech can be excluded simply because it is religious. 
Two qualifications must be noted here. First, Article VI, 
Clause 3 of the Constitution prohibits any "religious test" for 
holding public office. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation 
92 William Marshall is more explicit about the absence of a legal basis for 
the secularists' restrictions. He concedes that religious involvement "is not formally 
constitutionally proscribed" and that "informal constraint has no legal effect." Yet 
he still feels that "there is something improper about religion's involvement in poli-
tics." The Other Side of Religion, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993). He articulates no 
basis for restricting all religious involvement. Greenawalt also argues that no one 
is proposing legal restrictions on religious people but about "political ethics," i.e., 
about how people should act. The Role of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Dilem-
mas and Possible Resolutions, 35 J. CHURCH & ST. 503, 505-06 (1993). 
93 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (right of religious ministers to hold 
office). 
94 !d. at 640 (Brennan, J., concurring)(quoting New York v. Sullivan, 376 
u.s. 254, 270 (1964)). 
95 See discussion supra part II.B. 
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in Torcaso v. Watkins, this prevents "probing religious beliefs 
by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or 
perhaps, more properly, profess to have, a belief in some partic-
ular kind of religious concept."96 In effect, this clause reduces 
to one special application of the Establishment Clause under 
the interpretation advocated here. 
Second, a distinction must be made in one respect between 
religious individuals and religious institutions. Under federal 
law, tax-exempt organizations may keep their tax-exempt sta-
tus only if no "substantial" part of their activities "is carrying 
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legisla-
tion ... , and which does not participate in, or intervene in (in-
cluding the publishing or distributing of statements), any politi-
cal campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
public office."97 In short, religious and nonreligious organiza-
tions must choose between a tax-exempt status and legislative 
lobbying or involving themselves directly in political cam-
prugns. 
This latter restriction, however, does not apply to individu-
al members of such organizations (although it is not always 
clear when a member of a religious group is speaking individu-
ally or for the organization). Nor does it apply to religious or-
ganizations that do not claim tax-exempt status. For those 
groups and for individuals, only the Establishment Clause pro-
vides a restriction on religion in politics. Even tax-exempt orga-
nizations under the above-cited statute may take stands on 
moral and social questions that are current campaign issues as 
long as they do not lobby or directly participate in a specific 
political campaign (e.g., endorsing a specific candidate). In this 
way, religious groups may influence public policy and the politi-
cal process in general. 
With these qualifications in mind, the Establishment 
Clause remains the only major limitation against relying on 
religious convictions in politics. Religious political speech can-
not be treated differently from other forms of political speech. 
In the words of former Justice William Brennan, "Religionists 
96 367 u.s. 488, 494 (1961). 
97 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986); see Legislative Activity by Certain Types of 
Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 99, 282-312 (1972) (comments by religious organizations). Religion 
is not discriminated against here since this restriction applies to all tax-exempt 
organizations. 
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no less than members of any other group enjoy the full mea-
sure of protection afforded speech, association, and political 
activity generally."98 Professor Tribe summarizes the situa-
tion: 
American courts have not thought the separation of church 
and state to require that religion be totally oblivious to gov-
ernment or politics; church and religious groups in the United 
States have long exerted powerful political pressures on state 
and national legislatures, on subjects as diverse as slavery, 
war, gambling, drinking, prostitution, marriage, and educa-
tion. To view such religious activity as suspect, or to regard 
its political results as automatically tainted, might be incon-
sistent with first amendment freedoms of religious and politi-
cal expression.99 
There is no other legal restriction on the admission of 
religion to the public arena. Indeed, as mentioned above, the 
Establishment Clause is only a restriction on governmental 
action, not on private advocacy. It restricts what can be advo-
cated only in the sense that in order for an advocated act to 
withstand a constitutional challenge, it must have a purpose or 
justification which is secular (nontheocratic). 100 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH SECULARISTS' VISIONS FOR SOCIETY 
Because the Establishment Clause is the controlling princi-
ple, issues raised by Audi, Perry, Greenawalt, and others-such 
as acceptable versus unacceptable religious beliefs, or public 
versus religious reasoning101-simply dissolve. But there are 
certain legal and philosophical problems with the secularists' 
positions, even as ideals for society, that must be pointed out. 
A. Fallibilism and Politics 
Michael Perry sets forth a vision of an "ecumenical politics" 
in which some persons with religious convictions may rely on 
98 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
99 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 866-67 (1978) (cited 
in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at 641 n.25 (Brennan, J., concurring)). More recent-
ly, Justice Scalia put the point succinctly: "political activism by the religiously 
motivated is part of our heritage." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
100 See discussion supra part II.B. 
101 See, for example, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 49-76, for 
further discussion. 
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those convictions both in motivating political choices and in 
publicly debating those choices. 102 Nevertheless, Perry does 
not treat all religious convictions equally: two attitudes are es-
sential for membership in the ecumenical political dialogue--
pluralism and fallibilism. 
1. Pluralism 
Pluralism is, in effect, merely accepting dialogue rather 
than the dogmatic assertions of one's position. 103 Theocrats, 
who do not recognize the possible legitimacy of other positions, 
would thus be eliminated from politics, as would any 
nontheocrats who accept nontheocratic purposes and justifica-
tions but are nevertheless dogmatic. Nonetheless, not all 
religiously-based citizens who take their religious faith seri-
ously are dogmatic with regard to how other people should lead 
their lives, and many allow a difference of positions on political 
issues. Such people should be able to accept democratic process-
es on political issues. Perry's requirement indicates one of the 
secularists' prejudices against religion-that all religious per-
sons are dogmatic about their beliefs. 104 
Secularists believe religious people are not open to the 
possibility of nontheocratic forms of government; instead, the 
religious vote with one voice as their dogmatic leaders instruct 
them. A recent remark by Justice Harry Blackmun suggests 
this position: 
Democracy requires the nourishment of dialogue and dissent, 
while religious faith puts its trust in an ultimate divine au-
thority above all human deliberation. When the government 
appropriates religious truth, it 'transforms rational debate 
into theological decree.' Those who disagree no longer are 
questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules of 
a higher authority who is beyond reproach. 105 
102 PERRY, supra note 2, at 112. 
103 !d. at 110. 
104 Many religious persons have genuine doubts about the certainty of their 
beliefs and how to lead their lives while still remaining committed to that way of 
life. But this does not mean that Perry is correct about self-critical "faith" versus 
"belief" -the religious are not any closer to holding an abstract faith because of 
their doubts. Their concrete religious values and beliefs, not some abstract faith, 
remain the substance of their ways of life and of their doubts. 
105 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
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To have all religious believers alike in this matter is unlikely 
(e.g., religious groups disagree over official prayers in schools; 
and not all Roman Catholics vote against pro-choice candi-
dates). This position does not take into account the striking 
diversity of religious political views exemplified by the contrast 
between Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson. 106 In addition, 
whether religious believers are in fact any more intransigent in 
their political beliefs than those nonreligious persons who are 
serious about their own beliefs and values is a matter for em-
pirical investigation. 
Our constitutional rights in this regard do not turn on an 
empirical inquiry. Anyone, religious or nonreligious, who feels 
the irrefutable rightness of his or her position may still enter 
the political arena. To pass constitutional muster, they must 
advance purposes or justifications for their position which are 
secular in the anti-theocratic sense. Even theocrats, with their 
appeals to revelation or personal experiences, can legitimately 
enter political debates on one issue: whether to amend the 
Constitution to abolish the Establishment Clause and create a 
theocracy. The theocrats' appeal to revelation is constitutionally 
problematic because of their views on the nature of government, 
not because of any dogmatic assertion that their political posi-
tion is not open to debate or vote: it is the political program 
constituting an integral part of the theocrats' way of life that is 
in conflict with the Establishment Clause, not how their hold 
their faith. Nothing in the history of the Establishment Clause 
or its jurisprudence suggests that the modern liberal/secularist 
reading of the First Amendment requires an allegiance by 
citizens to rational debate, so that those who would advocate 
religious grounds for public policy must defend their convic-
tions by appeal to considerations that can be assessed by all 
members of the public. 107 The intent of the Establishment 
Clause is to eliminate the possibility of a theocracy, but not to 
otherwise limit participation in the processes of governing. 
106 Cf PETER L. BENSON & DOROTHY L. WILLIAMS, RELIGION ON CAPITOL 
HILL: MYTHS AND REALITIES 123-39, 143-48 (1982) (diversity of politicians' religious 
views correlated with a wide variety of political beliefs). 
107 Contra Franklin I. Gamwell, Religwn and Reason 1n Amencan Politics, 2 
J.L. & RELIGION 325 (1984). Some of the Founders were heavily influenced by the 
Enlightenment, but not all who framed and ratified the First Amendment were; 
and nothing in the history of the Establishment Clause suggests that the En-
lightenment rationality was to play a central role in what was being required of 
the citizenry. 
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2. Fallibilism 
Perry's second requirement-fallibilism-presents a great-
er problem. He characterizes this attitude as the ideal of 
self-critical rationality (exemplified in the sciences) in which 
one holds one's fundamental beliefs open to scrutiny, revision, 
and possible rejection. 108 According to fallibilism, only people 
who hold their religious faith open to such self-criticism would 
be permitted to participate in the political arena. 
Two objections to this argument, one legal and one philo-
sophical, present themselves immediately. First, the Establish-
ment Clause under every interpretation prohibits discrimina-
tion among religions, 109 with the qualification that it does dis-
criminate against those religious persons whose political pro-
gram is incompatible with the anti-establishment requirement 
itself (i.e., advocates of theocracies).uo Under Perry's propos-
al, the religious would be divided on the basis of the very na-
ture of the religious commitment, not upon whether their politi-
cal programs conflict with the Constitution. Any proposal that 
would exclude the political speech of some religious persons 
while permitting that of others could not be enforceable in any 
way. Distinguishing "true" from "false" religions in any respect 
is simply not a matter for the government. 
In addition, fallibilism has another substantial problem: 
most religious people simply do not consider their faith in such 
terms. While the religious may have doubts about their partic-
ular way of life or even concede the theoretical possibility of 
error, they still remain committed to that way of life. Perry 
may be able to find a few liberal academics who shape their 
faith in a fallibilistic manner, but to require such a standard 
would exclude the vast majority of religious Americans. People, 
religious and nonreligious, simply do not hold their fundamen-
tal beliefs open to such self-critical analysis. 
Moreover, people need not hold their fundamental beliefs 
open to such criticism in order to participate in our public life. 
Fallibilism may be the appropriate attitude in a philosophical 
discussion or in a dialogue between religious faiths, but it is 
totally irrelevant to politics. All that is needed to participate in 
our political arena is a willingness to accept secular 
108 PERRY, supra note 2, at 110. 
109 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Larson v. Valente, 456 
U.S. 228, 246-52 (1982). 
110 See dis(.-ussion supra part II.A. 
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(nontheocratic) purposes and justifications for governmental 
actions. This does not mean that we must be willing to ques-
tion our own belief-framework, but only that we accept a 
nontheocratic government. It is a matter of accepting the na-
ture of our country, not about the nature of one's religious 
commitment. 
Theocrats would be excluded from the political arena, but 
other religious persons who hold firmly to their faith would not 
be excluded as long as they accept that this republic is based 
on a pluralism of faiths (and non-belief), and is not simply a 
mirror of one religious vision. For example, Roman Catholics 
need not doubt their church's official position on issues of abor-
tion, divorce, and conception, and they may even work to 
change the laws regarding these issues so that they reflect 
Roman Catholic beliefs, but they must accept the secular pur-
pose and justification requirements of the Establishment 
Clause. The issue is what actions one would require of people 
outside one's own faith. 111 For that, there is no requirement 
that we have to question our fundamental beliefs as applied to 
our own lives or to hold them open to doubt. Being open to per-
suasion about how the country is to be run may be a prerequi-
site to participating in politics, but being open to, in effect, a 
religious conversion is not. 
In short, Perry's fallibilism is impossible from a practical 
standpoint and unnecessary from a legal standpoint. Perry's 
fallibilism, combined with his distinction between faith and 
belief, 11lJroduces a lop-sided compromise between religious 
and anti-religious extremes that would allow only certain reli-
gious persons to be heard-that is, only those religious persons 
whose faith fits a distorted version of religious commitment. 
Perry's distinction between "faith" and "belief," if accepted, 
would mean that no conviction based upon real religion-i.e, 
the commitment embodied in religious belief, not some artifi-
cially abstracted faith-would be permitted into the public 
realm. 113 Those religious persons who are firmly committed to 
their faith-and who often advocate conservative political 
beliefs--would be excluded. This vision may suit theorists whose 
political beliefs are left of center, but there are no reasons 
111 See discussion supra part LB. 
112 See discussion supra part I.C. 
113 Thus, Perry's program has the effect of a secularist's, even if Perry does 
not consider himself a secularist. 
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(other than transparently political ones) to adopt Perry's posi-
tion. 
B. Reason and Politics 
Some secularists accept that religious convictions may play 
a role in motivating political positions, but that such reliance 
must be bracketed in justifications.114 In their political ideal, 
universal reason, or at least premises and methods of reason-
ing generally accepted in our culture, will eventually be able to 
resolve political issues/ 15 and therefore religion, with its pri-
vate sources of insights, will play no role in such resolu-
tions.116 In the words of Stephen Gey, "religion is fundamen-
tally incompatible" with "the critical rationality on which de-
mocracy depends," because religious ideas cannot be scientifi-
cally proven. 117 Politics is to be rational and voluntary, not 
irrational and dictated by religious leaders. Only secular rea-
sons are therefore permitted in debating political positions. 118 
114 E.g., Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 284. 
115 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 24-30. 
116 It should be noted that some philosophers and theologians think that 
religion is as publicly accessible as science, i.e., revealed claims are accessible to 
all or fundamental religious claims are provable by publicly accessible reason (e.g., 
reliance on public evidence and reason in the classical proofs of the existence of 
God). These theorists believe that religious beliefs are objective, and that anyone 
who accepts their truth will see that. (Under such a position, that their arguments 
do not convince everyone only shows the limitation of any appeal to public reason.) 
Others would argue that even mystical experiences are open to everyone-we mere-
ly must be willing to undergo the rigors of the training. One theorist, Ronald 
Green, believes that "religions are primarily moved by rational moral concerns." 
REUGION AND MORAL REASON 228 (1988). Theocrats may also feel that their au-
thorities are open to all. See discussion supra note 65. Since I do not adhere to 
this position on the nature of religious faith, I will not use it for support. There 
may be some beliefs held within both religious and nonreligious ways of life which 
are rational in the sense that everyone who understood them would accept them, 
whether they are within that religious tradition or not. See Some Further 
Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1032. But all basic belief-commitments-religious and 
nonreligious-are nonrational (as discussed below). Even if all the political argu-
ments made by the religious and nonreligious within their particular ways of life 
satisfied a public accessibility standard, the basic commitments of the ways of life 
will still not be dictated by those arguments (as discussed below). Fundamental 
choices will remain. But for the issue of governing, it is the secular purpose and 
justification requirements, not any alleged rationality of political claims, that differ-
entiates the arguments. 
117 Gey, supra note 20, at 174. 
118 This position is broadly based on a commitment to rationalism of the 
modern Enlightenment. Publicly accessible reason is our highest faculty; it can 
destroy superstitions, dissolve delusions, and resolve all disagreements-in fact, 
reason will provide a basis for ethics and hence for politics, and lead to a univer-
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Of course, rationality does play a role in politics to a cer-
tain extent. Presumably, no legislature would pass a bill for 
which supporters can only advance a justification that is pa-
tently irrational in the sense that it is somehow based on an 
empirical claim for which there is no empirical support (e.g., 
Martians are threatening to invade if we do not pass the bill). 
The proper response to such a situation for one committed to 
rationality is not to exclude such a claim from the market place 
of ideas, but to address it with counter-arguments. We all hope 
that the totally irrational claims would be weeded out in such a 
process. 
However, beyond such a situation, it is not clear in what 
sense "rationality" is involved in politics. John Rawls, while 
denying any overarching standard in terms of which competing 
concepts of societal good can be adjudicated, speaks of liberals' 
belief in a set of "ideals, principles and standards that all mem-
bers of society can not only affirm but also mutually recognize 
before one another" when it comes to any social issue over 
which there is political dispute. 119 Rawls had earlier spoken 
of "evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all," and de-
fined the standards as "common sense and science."120 Liber-
als think that, given enough time, publicly-accessible reason 
will resolve political disputes. Concerning political problems on 
the more mundane end of the spectrum (e.g., how best to help 
victims of a hurricane), people with different religious and 
nonreligious points of views can usually form an "overlapping 
consensus" in which their diverging and incommensurable 
fundamental points of view do not matter (although differences 
may continue, e.g., over what in fact constitutes the best help). 
The problem for the liberals' position arises with the more 
fundamental social issues and policies (e.g., civil rights, wars, 
abortion, pomography, homosexuality, or religion in the public 
sal rational civilization. For criticism of the very possibility of the Enlightenment 
project, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFI'ER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984). 
119 John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 4 n.5 (1987). Rawls, while a liberal, should not be included among the secu-
larists since his idea of an overlapping consensus includes "all the opposing philo-
sophical and religious doctrines likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more 
or less just constitutional democratic society." John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: 
Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 225-26 (1985). This consensus 
does not involve a commitment to a specific conception of the good or a substan-
tive worldview or ideal, as do the secularists' visions. 
120 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 212, 240-41 (1971). See also PERRY, 
supra note 2, at 60. 
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schools). Here, science and common sense will not resolve the 
political dispute. The problem is the presence of conflicting 
fundamental premises over societal goals, the nature of a per-
son, and so forth. Within our constitutional framework, reasons 
must be public, in the sense of not being theocratic-reasons 
based exclusively on revealed texts or private insights are not 
sufficient in political debates for the constitutional reasons 
discussed above. Liberals, however, would require a stronger, 
substantive sense of public reasons: only reasons grounded in 
principles of science and the supposed common sense of a cul-
ture would be permitted. Any other reasons not shared by all 
(which would include most religious beliefs, not merely theocra-
tic ones) would be excluded. 
But for political issues that touch upon basic beliefs, no 
shared beliefs and values will collectively suffice to overcome 
the conflict of premises. 121 Indeed, it is not clear how science 
would figure into determining the basic issues, such as social 
goals. Scientific knowledge may contribute to the determination 
of which values seem "reasonable" in light of particular theo-
ries, but science cannot resolve all the basic value questions. 
For example, we may all agree on a scientific account of the 
development of a human fetus and still disagree on when life 
begins or to what rights the fetus is entitled. Decisions over 
social goals are informed by science, but more encompassing 
sets of values than science's are involved in resolving such 
issues. Political issues involving a conflict over basic values will 
remain moral crises precisely because of the intractable diver-
gence of basic premises. 
It is doubtful whether any neutral ground for arguing 
about value and belief premises can be proposed without beg-
ging the question against some of the participants. (Secularists, 
as most people would, propose standards for politics which 
implicitly permit themselves to rely upon their own premises 
and eliminate those groups which offend them.) But it is not 
obvious that a "common reason" or any neutral ground to re-
solve political disputes is in fact needed. As long as different 
religious and nonreligious participants can understand each 
other, no more commonality is needed. In science, progress has 
been possible even though the disputants over changing theo-
ries speak, in an important sense, different ''languages" about 
121 See RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 87-172, for a strong case 
against believing that publicly accessible reason can resolve all political issues. 
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experiential data (e.g., Ptolemy and Copernicus meant quite 
different things by the word "sun"). Understanding each other 
without a common language is similar to comparing different 
map projections-the maps are incommensurable, but we can 
locate points in any projection. In such circumstances, scientific 
disputes have been resolved and science has progressed with-
out the translation of different languages into some (nonexis-
tent) neutral observation-language. 
If scientists can resolve disputes and form a consensus 
without a common, neutral language, then disputants in a 
political dialogue should not be required to operate with a neu-
tral language. The religious may use religious language, and 
the nonreligious may avoid such language. There is no need for 
only one language, even if a neutral language between religious 
and nonreligious discourse were possible. There is also no need 
for translating religious arguments into nonreligious ones (or 
vice-versa), even if this were possible. 122 The crucial require-
ment is that each of the disputants can understand the other's 
points. A genuine argument on the different political positions 
is then possible. 
Many secularists appear to have a very unsophisticated 
faith in the power of reason and in an alleged "scientific meth-
od." They do not explore the issue of rationality at all. In using 
rationality as exemplified in science as their ideal, they seem to 
think that "rationality" is something obvious and unproblem-
atic. But under the contemporary philosophical accounts of 
science, the very notion of "rationality" is seen as beset with 
difficulties. Indeed, it is not at all clear how exactly reason, in 
122 Contra PERRY, supra note 2, at 105-08; see also Religious Convictions, 
supra note 3, at 256-57. Religious participants may omit arguments which they 
think will not be persuasive to anyone outside their religious group; but this does 
not mean that the reasons the religious decide to present to opponents are "trans-
lations" of their fundamental beliefs into "public" terms. A true translation of reli-
gious language into a nonreligious language--a "publicly comprehensible" or "medi-
ating" one-cannot be accomplished in any meaningful sense. Unlike simply 
translating, for example, English into French (which would keep the religious 
meaning), no translation of religious language into a nonreligious one could be 
done without, by definition, losing the religious elements. It would be comparable 
to treating a two-dimensional depiction of an object as the object's equivalent. The 
projection captures some of the object, but there is also loss and distortion. If secu-
larists had to "translate" their fundamental beliefs into religious ones, distortion 
would also occur. Imposing a neutral language requirement would only encourage 
sham purposes and other deceptions on both sides, not full disclosure of real rea-
sons. But if there is no need for a neutral language (as is the case with science), 
this problem does not exist. 
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the abstract, figures in the development of science. The physi-
cist Max Planck gave this suggestive comment on how science 
changes: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing 
its opponents and making them see the light, but rather be-
cause its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows 
up that is familiar with it."123 Reason and an ideal "scientific 
method" as envisioned by the liberals do not seem to play a 
determinative role. Scientific argument is seen today more as a 
matter of persuasion-Thomas Kuhn even speaks of a "conver-
sion experience"124-than of some neutral algorithm deter-
mining a decision between competing theories. Paul 
Feyerabend can say with all the seriousness that the 
self-proclaimed Dadaist of epistemology can muster that "any-
thing goes" in science and "irrationality" reigns. 125 The title to 
one of his books clearly reflects his position--Farewell to Rea-
son.'zs 
Needless to say, not all philosophers follow such an ex-
treme position on reason, but most have given up the empiri-
cist ideal of neutral sense-experience or any encompassing 
decision-making mechanisms determining the selection of a 
theory. Scientists are seen as engaged in a more typical human 
enterprise, rather than simply mechanically reading objective 
truth off of nature. They must choose the best available theory 
from among currently competing theories by weighing such fac-
tors as fruitfulness, coherence with other ideas, simplicity, 
scope, and empirical fit. But, choices remain-reality does not 
uniquely determine one theory as better or more acceptable 
than the rest. No set of neutral sense-experiences compels the 
choice between competing theories in any simple manner. And 
no "scientific method" for devising hypotheses, testing them, 
and adding irrefutable facts to our storehouse of knowledge 
exists for any scientific inquiry. A role for the non-rational (in 
the sense of beliefs that are not demonstrable regardless of 
123 MAX PLANCK, SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY 33-34 (F. Gaynor trans., 1949), 
quoted in THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 151 (2d 
ed. 1970). 
124 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, 151 (2d 
ed. 1970). 
125 If we remove his rhetoric, Feyerabend means by "irrationality," the lack of 
any formal algorithm compelling rational agreement among scientists. See PAUL 
FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTUNE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF KNOWL· 
EDGE (1975). 
126 See generally PAUL FEYERABEND, FAREWELL TO REASON (1978). 
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background beliefs) is made in scientific decision-making, and 
how agreement over a new theory emerges becomes a central 
problem. 
Not only is there no one "scientific method" for determining 
"truth," even standards of rationality ("reasonableness") appear 
not to be timeless but in fact to vary with different theo-
ries.127 Rationality involves not merely coherence of beliefs or 
holding one's beliefs open to criticism, but what is "plausible" 
in light of the underlying beliefs and values held at the time. 
The framework of what one takes to be the structure of reali-
ty-what is real-becomes intertwined in what is taken to be 
"rational," "natural," or "logical."128 "Common sense" changes 
from era to era. In short, rationality is now seen as having a 
substantive component, dependent on what one believes about 
reality, not merely procedural features such as self-criticism or 
belonging to an on-going community of investigators. 
Without going further into philosophy of science, the point 
here is simply that rationality is no longer seen as a simple 
concept, or as some abstract factor independent of our web of 
other beliefs and values. If rationality in an enterprise such as 
science is problematic, then surely secularists should not glibly 
invoke reason and scientific method as a cure-all in so chaotic 
an enterprise as politics. 
When it comes to the issue of religion in politics, one par-
ticular aspect of reasoning which leads to the secularists' 
misconstrual of reason should be pointed out. What is missing 
from the liberals' view of reasoning is any role for the under-
lying frameworks of values and beliefs concerning the ultimate 
nature of reality, nature of a person, what is good, what can be 
expected, goals to be achieved, and so forth. 129 Arguments are 
only made within such frameworks-our most deeply-held 
127 See THOMAS S. KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in 
THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 
320 (1977). 
128 Whether this view produces a cognitive relativism (each way of life in-
ternally setting up its own standards of truth and rationality, with no external 
standards by which to adjudicate among competing ways of life) will not be dis-
cussed here. 
129 These fundamental frameworks could be referred to as "metaphysics," al-
though the term has pejorative connotations. The frameworks are not beyond expe-
rience but are the most basic belief-commitments framing our experiences. They 
can be argued about and are open to change-they are deeply held, but not immu-
table. But while we may hold our frameworks up to criticism and revision, they 
are open to criticism only from within one or another such framework. 
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beliefs are the scaffolding holding our arguments together. 
Basic world views specify how things "really are" and what is 
"objective" for their holder. What is "reasonable" and who is 
being reasonable become normative issues. For example, Chris-
tian fundamentalists argue that if we do not accept the literal 
truth of the Bible and that Jesus is the Son of God, we are not 
seeing the way things really are and so are not being "reason-
able" in its ultimate sense. 
The anti-religious, on the other hand, think this is not 
being "reasonable"-indeed, accepting Biblical claims in spite of 
science is the epitome of irrationality. They give natural science 
a metaphysical interpretation: science exhausts our knowl-
edge-it is the only way of knowing, and only what is known 
through science is real. The anti-religious' arguments make 
sense only within that framework. 130 However, the basic pre-
mises of their positions compete on the same level with those of 
the fundamentalists. That is, the dispute is not over empirical 
evidence for an empirical claim, but a contest over a metaphys-
ics of naturalism versus a metaphysics in which a rational 
being (the god of classical theism) intervenes in nature. 131 
Whether this conflict between such positions is resolvable 
through reasoning is unlikely, precisely because of the 
disputants' commitments to conflicting basic beliefs and values. 
Secularists hope to eliminate reference to all such frame-
works of belief, religious and nonreligious. 132 Indeed, they 
130 A limited but more direct example is how "theory" shapes "fact" in polit-
ical scientists' study of American religion. Political theorists largely ignore the role 
of religion in human affairs because certain social theories dominating political 
science circles predict the inevitable decline of religion; these theories dictate what 
political scientists consider important, and what they consider irrelevant. Allen D. 
Hertzke, American Religion and Politics: A Review Essay, 41 W. POL. Q. 825 
(1988). Religion as a social force is thereby filtered out of what these theorists 
consider causal factors. While religion may in fact decline someday, these theorists' 
persistence today in adhering to these theories as ways of explaining American 
society is truly amazing considering the continuing significance of religion in our 
culture and our political life. 
131 At least some claims advanced by biblical fundamentalists can be defend-
ed in ways other than biblical literalism. See Alvin Plantinga, When Faith and 
Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible, 21 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REV. 8 (1991). 
Whether or not we find Plantinga's arguments convincing, no one would consider 
him irrational in any usual sense of the term. 
132 Not all secularists (e.g., Audi) are clear that nonreligious frameworks 
must be treated in the same way as religious ones. Edward Foley is clearer on 
equal treatment in his Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954 
(1992) (book review). There would be a clear violation of the Establishment Clause 
if references to religious frameworks of belief are all to be treated differently and 
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would deny any appeal to truth in political argument. 133 No 
claim that advocated that values or goals reflect the nature of 
reality could be supported. But, for a reason to be convincing, it 
cannot be abstracted from a total argument. As with scientific 
disputes, reasons presuppose a background of belief. What is 
and is not taken to be a reason depends on such background, 
and it is impossible to extricate reasons from their context-if 
''public reason" is supposed to be something that will convince 
anyone regardless of their background beliefs, then no such 
reason concerning fundamental political matters exists. Since 
normally most people argue only with those who share a com-
mon framework of belief, there is usually no need to examine 
our background beliefs. But when disputes arise between par-
ticipants with conflicting background belief-commitments, as 
happens in political disputes (e.g., over abortion on when life 
begins and on the rights of a fetus), the background beliefs 
often must be made explicit. Many arguments each participant 
advances often only make sense when seen within the context 
of a conflict of basic frameworks. 
That all religious and nonreligious people reason only with-
in such frameworks means that the frameworks cannot be 
eliminated. Of course, different religious and nonreligious per-
sons may reach the same conclusions for different rea-
sons-after all, one can reach only a limited number of final 
conclusions on any political issue. Also, as mentioned earlier, 
there is no one "religious" position on any political issue, past 
or present, or by contrast, one "secular" position. But this does 
not mean that religious people somehow reach their conclusions 
through some neutral considerations other than religious prem-
ises so that the frameworks within which they reason can 
somehow be jettisoned, or that there is a common abstract 
ground upon which they are in reality arguing. People only 
reason within their total framework; it provides their orienta-
tion of what makes sense. People advance what seem to them 
excluded, while references to nonreligious ones are permitted into the political 
arena. The same would hold if we forced all political arguments to be stated with-
in one framework. Nonreligious frameworks for belief (e.g., science metaphysically 
interpreted as naturalism) are as much "beyond reason" as religious ones: people 
who have adopted any nonreligious fundamental beliefs about the way things really 
are cannot advance reasons that are neutral between all ways of life to defend 
their choice and to convince all "reasonable" opponents. All fundamental commit-
ments, religious and otherwise, are in the same class in this regard. 
133 Nagel, supra note 1, at 229. 
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to be evidence or reasons only within that context. Even if their 
reasons, like their conclusions, converge with other people's 
reasons in an abstract sense, this does not mean that their 
framework of belief is somehow irrelevant to their thinking or 
that their reasons are actually nonreligious. 
Consider the role of morality in ways of reasoning. Even if 
a theist and an atheist converge on exactly the same set of 
moral precepts, morality still is not independent of religion for 
a religious person, any more than it is really dependent upon a 
religious reality for the atheist. As a philosophical matter, we 
may argue that morality is not dependent for its value or justi-
fication on the existence of God or any other reli-
giously-significant reality, but this does not mean that morality 
is really an independent, nonreligious value system which is 
merely tacked onto a religious way of life. For the religious, 
morality is not a nonreligious component of a religious way of 
life. Indeed, whether morality is an autonomous point of view 
independent of an arguer's interests or particular conceptions 
of what is good is open to question. 134 
Morality does not appear to be a universal layer of reason-
ing independent of every other belief and value in one's way of 
life. 135 Instead, beliefs of what is real affect what we deter-
mine to be valuable and what we should do or achieve. Thus, in 
moral religious ways of life, morality is integral to the thinking 
and acting of the religious persons, and basic religious beliefs 
and values form the foundation for their moral arguments. 
Trying, in the name of creating a common playing field for 
politics, to force religious persons to think morally without re-
sorting to the other components integrated into their faith 
would be asking for either the impossible or something so arti-
134 See JEFFREY STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY 
AND THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMY 218-55 (1981). 
135 One cannot argue that all people actually hold the same moral beliefs by 
facilely distinguishing the content of a moral code from the reasons or motives for 
holding it. To be deemed moral, a code of conduct must be based upon a concern 
for the well-being of others. But the assumption that the concrete prescriptions in 
all moral codes are the same is far from certain. For example, the scope of injunc-
tions against murder vary widely: Buddhist and Jaina codes of conduct tend to 
condemn all killing of humans and animals; other codes limit their injunctions in 
different ways. It appears that the content of different codes of conduct shapes and 
is shaped by the other components of the total ways of life of which they are part. 
See RICHARD H. JONES, MYSTICISM EXAMINED 187-215 (1993). Any consensus re-
flected in a society's laws does not mean that the scope and content of the various 
religious codes of the society's members are similarly limited. 
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ficial as not to reflect their true position. The same holds true 
for trying to force nonreligious persons to genuinely think "reli-
giously." 
In such circumstances, all persons will rely on their most 
fundamental beliefs and values when they advance purposes, 
justifications, and conclusions in arguing about significant po-
litical issues. Reasoning is too complicated to be broken neatly 
into a publicly accessible or moral component and a separable 
belief component constituted by background beliefs. People do 
not argue with isolated abstract points while ignoring the rest 
of what appear reasonable to them. And any political theory 
which would attempt to require such artificiality cannot be 
acceptable. It is a fantasy to think religious people can delete 
the "religious" parts of their ways of life and still be left with 
any kind of meaningful whole from which to defend a position. 
People cannot compartmentalize their lives and beliefs in such 
a manner. 
This also means that everyone relies on non-rational ele-
ments in their reasoning, i.e., beliefs which are not demonstra-
ble regardless of background beliefs. We all have nonrational 
commitments which set the bounds within which reason oper-
ates. Only within those bounds do the issues arise of the ra-
tionality or irrationality, justification or lack thereof, of a par-
ticular belief. 136 We cannot verify all our beliefs within our 
web of beliefs by standards independent of those beliefs. 
Most importantly, secularists are not in an epistemolog-
ically superior position in this regard to the religious. Religious 
people are not inherently irrational, nor secularists inherently 
rational. Contrary to the liberal image of religion, religion and 
reason are not opposing activities. Instead, the religious, like 
everyone else, can reason and argue within a framework of 
belief. Both the religious and the nonreligious have 
non-rational presuppositions setting up the framework within 
which they argue-everyone has unprovable elements in the 
body of their beliefs, no matter how informed by science their 
beliefs may be. 
Calling ultimate belief-commitments "non-rational" may 
make such commitments sound arbitrary, unreasonable or 
irrational. However, the point is simply that no ultimate belief 
and value premises can be established by the reasoning we use 
136 See Thomas W. Clark, Relativism and the Limits of Rationality, HUMANIST 
Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 25 (giving an account of this position on a popular level). 
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once we adopt those premises, since we use the basic premises 
as a fundamental component of the arguments. The least 
changeable strands of our webs of belief are a substantive com-
ponent to our rationality. As discussed above, reasons are ad-
vanced only within ways of life. There is no abstract reason 
disembodied from beliefs and values about what is real. 137 
There is no neutral, universal, objective point of view-a privi-
leged "view from nowhere" which portrays things as they really 
are independently of a particular human condition-from which 
we can disinterestedly judge different ways of life. This also 
means that we judge other ways of life (and criticize our own) 
only from within a framework to which we have made at least 
a tentative commitment. Secularists cannot merely wish away 
the deep beliefs that divide us by saying that they should not 
be part of our reasoning. 
One consequence of this is that religious and nonreligious 
frameworks may become part of some political arguments. 
Indeed, whatever major political issues are at the time intrac-
table will involve basic beliefs, and so may end up being more 
about the background commitments than the political actions 
alone. Such arguments will be frustrating and the possibility of 
agreement will be slim. All participants can state their posi-
tion, their reasons for it, and address their opponents' argu-
ments. People do reach the same political conclusion from a 
limited set of choices, although for different reasons. But as 
long as a wide pluralism of conflicting fundamental beliefs and 
values on many social issues remains in our society, there is 
little possibility of a reasoned resolution of those issues in the 
sense of all parties agreeing to one belief-framework and argu-
mg with shared terms within that framework to an 
agreement. 138 
137 See P. F. STRAWSON, SKEPI'ICJSM AND NATURALISM 38 (1985). 
138 Basic beliefs, values and codes of conduct do not always determine politi-
cal positions in a simple manner. For example, if the value-component of a way of 
life is only a general ethos and the belief-component is only a general worldview, 
then the specifics necessary to make the ethos operative will have to come from 
factors other than the basic framework of belief. For example, Christians are com-
mended to love their neighbors, but what specific actions are required to do this in 
each concrete situation is not always made clear in the basic religious texts; the 
role of continuous teaching and interpretations by religious authorities thereby be-
comes important. Where such interpretations are needed, political arguments may 
be able to proceed without concentrating on the basic values and beliefs; the dis-
putes will deal more with the less deeply-embedded factors. But some religious 
beliefs and codes of rules are very detailed (e.g., the Old and New Testaments, if 
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Thus, there is no reason to expect a "rational" resolution of 
some significant political issues in the sense secularists hope 
for, and the faith of liberalism in the power of abstract reason 
is therefore misplaced. Secularists simply do not appreciate the 
high standard they are requiring. They are not demanding 
rationality in the sense of coherence of beliefs or reason under-
stood instrumentally as determining the best means to an end. 
Instead, they are asking for the impossible-a reasoned justifi-
cation of all of one's web of beliefs. Even earning a Ph.D. in 
philosophy would not enable one to participate in such a politi-
cal ideal. 
Of course, given enough time, a consensus on issues once 
in controversy will emerge, at least temporarily. But this only 
means that the consensus results from various social or politi-
cal factors, not from reason alone as liberals envision the pro-
cess. Max Planck's view of how science progresses, cited earlier, 
may be even more applicable, mutatis mutandis, to political 
solutions of fundamental social issues. Fortunately, the Estab-
lishment Clause requirements, not any ideal of publicly accessi-
ble reason or rational dialogue, are all that matter for our so-
ciety in this area. 
C. The Secularists' Visions of a Society as Ideals 
The last section argued that the secularists' visions for our 
society are not plausible because of an unrealistic faith in the 
power of reason disembodied from any fundamental beliefs and 
values to resolve disputes. The last point to be made is that, 
even if they were plausible, the secularists' visions are inconsis-
tent with the constitutional foundations of this country as long 
as religion with any kind of public dimension continues to ex-
ist. 
Although secularists may claim no hostility toward religion 
(but only neutrality by removing all references to both religious 
and nonreligious frameworks of belief), their ideal for good 
citizenship in a democratic society forces religion to be no more 
than a personal hobby or a private club without a role to play 
in the public arena. 139 At best, religious ministers would be 
read literally, contain specific condemnations of homosexuality). Thereby, political 
positions for those who opt for a theocratic political program (see discussion supra 
part I.B) are determined more directly from the basic religious framework. Conflicts 
among various religious and nonreligious basic commitments would be central in 
those cases. 
139 Some secularists may be motivated by the belief that religion is a harm-
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permitted to spout broad moral platitudes but nothing con-
crete-they can tell people "be good" or "do the right thing," but 
not tell them how actually to do this with regard to any polit-
ical issue. 140 Individuals would be left to decide on their own 
all political issues, since their leaders would not be permitted 
to advise them on this entire aspect of their lives. How this 
proposal could be implemented without the clergy losing all 
credibility with the religious, or without simply appearing silly 
to everyone, is not clear. Any voice of Christian or other minis-
ters or institutional leaders on basic moral issues would be 
lost. 141 Religion under these circumstances would be totally 
without effect in the political realm, even indirectly-in short, 
religion under this vision should be totally privatized. 
Such a vision is inconsistent with the role of religion envi-
sioned by the Framers of the Establishment Clause for our 
society: ours is not a secular society, and politics is not secular 
(in sense of being anti-religious or nonreligious). 142 The time 
may have passed when someone would readily describe Ameri-
ca as, in the words of G. K. Chesterson, "a nation with the soul 
of a church."143 But the Supreme Court has long recognized 
that "religious values pervade the fabric of our national 
life."144 By all social indicia, Americans are as religious as 
ever, and the social/political expression of that religiosity is 
ful delusion, a superstition, or otherwise irrational. But, as with religious persons 
in politics, the secularists' motives need not be explored-here, the effect of their 
program (to relegate religion to the purely private sphere) is what is important. 
140 Cf The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 274-75; Reli-
gious Commitment, supra note 1, at 69 (clergy may encourage political activism but 
not specific political actions). The secularists' restriction is broader than the 
tax-exemption restrictions noted above (n. 97) in that the latter only cover specific 
involvement in lobbying and political campaigns. See supra text accompanying note 
97. For example, under Audi's proposal, Roman Catholic priests could not recom-
mend that Catholics vote against all candidates who support abortion rights. 
141 If the religious are to provide no voice in public affairs, then the silence 
and complicity of the Lutheran Church under Nazi rule in Germany in the 1930's 
may be the example that secularists want American churches to exemplify. 
142 See discussion supra part II.A. 
143 Quoted in Sidney E. Mead, The "Nation with the Soul of a Church", re-
printed in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 45 (Russell E. Richey & Donald G. Jones, 
eds., 1974). 
144 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971). Some justices would go 
further. Justice William 0. Douglas earlier said: "We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 
(1952). Justice Robert Jackson said that "for good or for ill, nearly everything in 
our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturat-
ed with religious influences." McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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also as much alive. Our situation may change in the future, 
and religion may wither away through various social and eco-
nomic forces. But until that occurs, the denial of any public role 
for religion is inconsistent with the vision of society embodied 
in the Establishment Clause. As the Supreme Court recently 
said: "A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion 
from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent 
with the Constitution."145 The requirement of a secular pur-
pose and secular justification, along with other requirements, is 
imposed by the Establishment Clause, but not the secularists' 
requirements of secular (nonreligious) argumentation and moti-
vation that would produce a religionless public arena. 
Audi and others pay lip service to the Establishment 
Clause's separation of church and state but nothing in their 
writings indicate that their positions are informed by the 
clause's history or case law, or that they have any sense of its 
significance. (The same is true of our Free Exercise and Free 
Speech interests.) In speaking of "ideals" for our society, 146 
the secularists give the appearance of arguing about church 
and state when in fact they conceive no public role for 
churches. Audi must realize that the Establishment Clause 
does not actually support his position, for he speaks of the 
"spirit" of the separation of church and state. 147 But he wants 
to use the Establishment Clause in a way it was never intend-
ed in order to create a secular public life (i.e., a society with no 
public religion). In short, he wants to separate religion from 
politics, not church from state. The Framers did not intend the 
Establishment Clause to do this. 148 
The explanation for the secularists' lack of interest in the 
Establishment Clause or other possible legal restrictions on the 
role of religion is very simple: they are not interested in Ameri-
can society as now constituted. The secularists' "ideals" are 
simply visions for another society, not proposals about the prop-
145 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992). 
146 The Separation o( Church and State, supra note 1, at 276, 283; Religious 
Commitment, supra note 1, at 76; PERRY, supra note 2, at 137. 
147 The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 283. This use of 
the idea of the "spirit" of the "separation of church and state" is disturbing. Would 
secularists use the "spirit" of the Free Speech Clause (which also restricts only 
governmental actions) to censor private speech? If the Establishment Clause does 
not apply, why do secularists speak of it at all, except intentionally or unintention-
ally to give the appearance of authority and credibility to a normative political 
position unrelated to the Constitution? 
148 See discussion supra part IIA. 
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er interpretation of church/state relations within the existing 
framework provided by our Constitution. Therefore, an anchor 
in the legal foundations of this country in the Establishment 
Clause or other constitutional protections is unnecessary. The 
secularists' vision of a society in which religion is privatized 
(i.e., having no public function or influenced) becomes a vision 
of a society in which people who do not withdraw from society 
will have to hold a nonreligious worldview in some fashion. 
This is because a truncated form of religion-one that did not 
inform all of the faithful's life but only his or her private activi-
ty-is impossible. As discussed earlier, the source of meaning 
for the religious governs all of the religious person's life, not 
just selected portions of it. 149 
However, in dictating which parties may participate in the 
public life, the secularists' vision is not neutral but is based 
upon a substantive belief-system. 15° From a constitutional 
point of view, their visions become in effect the nonreligious 
equivalents of a theocracy. Since the secularists' visions entail 
a comprehensive belief-system, they must be defended as such. 
They are as ideological as theocratic visions for society, and 
indeed would compete with those and other visions for a soci-
ety. In turn, this means that secularists' arguments must oper-
ate on the same level as those of theocrats arguing for a theo-
cratic state. Thus, secularists must present arguments for the 
superiority of a nonreligious worldview.151 Neither party can 
argue that the burden of proof is on the other-each must ar-
gue for the viability of a way of life on the fundamental level of 
a basic vision. 
Thus, secularists should be clear in their arguments that 
they are proposing visions for another society and not propos-
ing changes within the constitutional framework of our existing 
one. Part of the secularists' political agenda may be to establish 
a thoroughly religionless world. There is nothing wrong with 
149 See discussion supra part LB. 
150 Rawls' conception of an overlapping consensus is neutral (permitting all 
beliefs to compete) and is not a substantive requirement of "neutral discourse" or 
any comprehensive belief-system which would eliminate participants with religious 
commitments. See discussion supra note 119. 
151 To be consistent, secularists cannot appeal to "truth," i.e., that their val-
ues reflect reality. Instead, they may attempt to show that nonreligious ideologies 
are socially more desirable, e.g., less divisive and volatile. Examples of 20th Centu-
ry secular (nonreligious) ideologies that have gained political control-e.g., fascism, 
communism, and various nationalisms-may present problems. 
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such political advocacy, and their motives for it are irrelevant. 
But their complete program of proposed governmental actions 
and restrictions should be made explicit. Secularists would ask 
the same of theocrats and other religious participants in poli-
tics. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Political philosophers have the reputation of spinning 
grand visions that are out of touch with the realities of our 
society. The work of most of the theorists discussed here only 
confirms that reputation. As a force for reform within our cur-
rent constitutional system, the secularists' visions for a new 
society (even if they were plausible) are not very effective be-
cause they do not deal with religion as it actually functions, 
and they have no interest in the role of religion currently per-
mitted in politics. Throughout the history of our country, lib-
eral and conservative religious groups have been forces on all 
sides of political issues in ways that have been consistent with 
the Establishment Clause. Our Constitution has set up a 
framework within which we can assess the propriety of any 
public religious activities. We should remain vigilant in making 
such assessments and focus less on fabricating ivory tower 
fantasies of societies in which an unrealistic version of reason 
determines everything and in which no fundamental beliefs 
except those of the secularists play a role. 
